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Western European Armed Forces and the Modernisation Agenda: Following or 
Falling Behind?1 
 
David J. Galbreath 
 
United States (US) armed forces are unrivalled in their ability to deliver military 
power persistently around the world. The future of armed warfare as we know it will 
be much dependent on what the US and its rivals bring to the table in terms of 
emerging technologies and the concepts, strategies and tactical operations that follow 
and use them. From the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW), US armed forces have steadily evolved towards reconceptualising 
high-intensity warfare not to mention advances in low-intensity warfare (Counter 
Insurgency or COIN). RAW, NCW and COIN along with the geo-political shift 
towards Asia, Africa and the Middle East leave Europe without a definable role in US 
grand strategy.  
At the same time, the role of Europe in the United States’ vision of its own 
national security and the way it conceptualises the world has changed. The United 
States (US) made a clear signal under the Barak Obama administration that its sense 
of security and power projection did not encapsulate the Trans-Atlantic relationship 
that had developed since the end of the Second World War. If we scratch the surface 
of the George W. Bush administration, we can also see that the US was unwilling to 
be constrained by Western Europe (or ‘old Europe) for the sake of maintaining a good 
security relationship. Indeed, without the Yugoslav wars, one could argue that the US 
withdrawal and refocus away from Europe would have occurred earlier, such as that 
suggested by John Mearsheimer (1990) in his infamous article ‘Back to the Future’. 
Indeed, from Christopher Weinberger2 onwards, the US was evolving away from 
Europe and the so-called ‘third generation’ that came with it. In as much as Europe 
remains important strategically, it is as a Rumsfeldian3 ‘lillipad’ for American power 
projection to Africa and the Middle East. 
  The key research question here is how Western European armed forces 
responding to the US transformation agenda? Are they following or falling behind? 
Following entails a role for European forces projecting military power outside of 
Europe while at the same time maintaining a stable and secure Europe. Following 
requires smart militaries, innovative war technologies and changes in how the battle 
space is conceptualised and engaged. Falling behind suggests a Europe unwilling to 
engage in the wider world, at first militarily and eventually politically. Falling behind 
leaves Western Europe unable to project outwards or to independently ensure 
European security independently. Europe’s response has the potential to shape global 
security in the Twenty First Century and thus the consequences of following or falling 
behind matter for Europe, the US and the World. 
 The paper examines Western European armed forces particularly in relation to 
the transformation agenda. The first section looks at how Western European militaries 
have changed since the Cold War. We pay particular attention to the key drivers of 
US and European military relations. The second section examines how the 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on research produced by a grant funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council entitled ‘The Drivers of Military Strategic Reform in the Face of Economic Crisis and 
Changing Warfare’ ES/K010190/1 
2 US Secretary of Defense during the Ronald Reagan administration from 1981 to 1987. 
3 From Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense during the George W. Bush administration from 
2001 to 2006. 
transformation agenda has impacted UK, French and German forces. We pay 
particular attention to network centricity, expeditionary forces and effects-based 
operations and look for transformation in operations, organisations and personnel. 
The final section concludes by arguing that European forces are more likely to follow 
than fall behind. 
 
Changes in European Defence 
The role of armed forces in Western Europe has changed much since the Cold War. 
Or at least one would expect. Despite the nature of risks and threats to European 
national security, many of the militaries we have today do much the same thing they 
did some two decades ago: remain ready to deploy conventional forces to defend or 
attack a territorial position. Yet, much of what European forces saw in Yugoslavia, 
not to mention Afghanistan and (for some) Iraq, many European states remain 
unsuited for anything other than territorial defence. At the same time, European 
societies are increasingly unsure of what to make of their militaries. European 
societies want to see their militaries as a force for ‘good’. European governments 
want to see their armed forces as stabilisers. Militaries themselves on the other hand 
are concerned with high-intensity kinetic warfare. All of these roles are about force 
projection. However, they require different sorts of militaries from one another. 
Finally, and in many ways most importantly, European militaries exist in a larger 
security community where the United States (US) plays an important role in shaping 
national interests and arguably even security identities. As the US has repositioned 
itself towards Asia, European militaries have been asked by the Americans to ‘pick up 
the slack’, ‘get on board’, and ‘be ready to play ball’. 
While we see changes in armed engagement, public expectations, and the geo-
political projection of power, we have to ask to what degree are Western European 
armed forces able to cope with the post-territorial warfare of the future? Why should 
we assume that warfare would be post-territorial? Firstly, proximity is becoming less 
important as power and technology change the way we think about space and time. 
For instance, the ability to project power far has the potential have ever decreasing 
costs as human-controlled and autonomous systems become more efficient and less 
resource heavy. Secondly and most importantly is the decline of defence in favour of 
security. We can see in Europe especially, there is a decline in what we consider a 
matter of martial defence though we can agree that some security issues, such as 
environmental crises, may lead martial responses.  
In other words, for good or ill, national and regional security is no longer a 
factor of the scale of military response, but rather something broader and more 
encompassing ranging environmental, economic, social and political challenges. For 
both of these reasons, the need for European militaries is more likely to be 
implementing security beyond the border rather than the defence of it. For this reason, 
we can see why West European states put a premium on force transformation. As a 
result, Europeans understand that there is an impetus for European militaries to 
change, not only because of budget pressures, but also because of what Europeans 
want and expect from their militaries is changing. When European militaries think of 
modernisation and force transformation, the Trans-Atlantic relationship, NATO, and 
the US Military all play a role as socialisers and ordering from the menu (see Jacoby 
2004). 
European militaries have deployed in joint operations with the US in and out 
of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. The 
future of joint operations depends on these allies to be able to continue to work 
together and, as discussed, this relationship is both empowered and threatened by 
transformation. This section looks specifically how the US and NATO have tried to 
influence European militaries through the transformation and modernisation agendas. 
Following this, we will be in a better position to analyse specific instances of impact 
amongst Western European forces. 
Contemporary force transformation is a result of changes in US thinking on 
how to plan and execute swift military operations on the ‘digitalised battlefield’ 
(Boyer 2004, 75). Transformation is not only about how militaries evolve to fight 
wars but also is aimed at changing the nature of war itself. As a consequence, as Yves 
Boyer has shown, European states must understand and in some cases even meet the 
challenges of transformation (2004). The natural interface between the US and 
European states is NATO and the transformation agenda has been a part of the NATO 
agenda since the 1990s but particularly after the George W. Bush Administration in 
2001. Yet, questions about post-Cold War interoperability were first addressed in the 
establishment of the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) in 1996. Among 
the US and its Anglophone allies, naval interoperability was also addressed in 
AUSCANNZUKUS, otherwise known as ‘Five Eyes’. While the MIC and ‘Five Eyes’ 
agreement have been important for interoperability, NATO became the vehicle of 
choice for the US attempts to bring RMA to its European allies. 
The ability for West European military powers to respond to US calls for 
transformation relies on two functions. The first function is the product of 
transformation as it has emanated from the US. The Joint Vision 2010 established 
both a view of technological change in the American military and the scope for 
implementation throughout the services. Importantly, the document established a joint 
strategy for implementing transformation.4 US transformation relies on ‘Full 
Spectrum Dominance’ ready to engage with everything from peacekeeping and crisis 
management to ‘fight to win’ scenarios. The document also calls on the greater 
communication and manoeuvrability between services as personnel, expertise and 
equipment is shared and distributed across the US military. In 34 pages, Joint Vision 
2010 attempts to formulate a template for force transformation. In terms of our 
analytical framework, we can see that RMA would evolve the US military to deal 
with full spectrum operations, greater organisational communication and increased 
training of personnel towards the use and deployment of ever-increasingly 
sophisticated technology. As Boyer illustrates, the RMA was ‘made in America.’  
The second function of force transformation is the ability and willingness of 
European forces to adapt to this American vision of modern and future warfare. Boyer 
argues that European allies were ‘first intrigued and then ‘requested’ to adjust their 
force posture to the shift in military affairs apparently being made by the US’ (2004, 
77). The launch of the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative at the Washington 
NATO Summit in 1999 also stressed upon US allies that change in line with RMA 
was encouraged. Boyer states, ‘the ambitions rapidly faded away, however, and the 
goals set by the DCI were, for the most part, never met by the Europeans’ (2004, 77).  
Was NATO the wrong vehicle for transformation in Europe? Boyer points to 
several constraints. The first is that the US pushed transformation at a time where 
both NATO and ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) were in times of 
change. Following the Washington Summit in 1999 (where the DCI was launched), 
NATO was being transformed further away from its Cold War roots of collective 
                                                 
4 See also the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) at www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (Last 
accessed 16 January 2014) 
defence in the face of large scale (or total) war. Again, questions were being asked 
about what role it had to play in Europe, allowing some to say that NATO’s existence 
started and ended with enlargement. At the same time, the St. Malo agreement 
between the UK and France and the subsequent Helsinki and Cologne European 
Councils allowed for the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), though its operationalization would not be sanctioned until the 2001 Nice 
Treaty.  
Secondly, ‘transformation’ itself was pushed by the US in NATO as more than 
simply changes in how the alliance prepared and deployed for war. Rather, the 
transformation agenda appeared to go far beyond this to represent the future of 
Europe’s continued military alliance with the US. Keep up or give up. Much has been 
written on the so-called capabilities gap between the US and Europe (as it was always 
thus) (see in particular Binnendijk and Kugler 2007; Coonen 2006; Yost 2007). Not 
only was Europe being told to keep up, but it was also being told that the rules of the 
game had changed. The US transformation agenda was taken in military circles in 
Europe much as it had been taken in much of the American military: as a passing fad. 
Christopher Schnaubelt (2007) argues that many in the US military were sceptical of 
why to transform areas in which one was already dominant. Could we expect 
something similar from European militaries? Perhaps not as a result of outright 
dominance like the US, but perhaps more in line with the lack of an external stimulus 
to change. 
The final reason why NATO was not fit for the transformation agenda was the 
breakdown in trust between European governments and the George W. Bush 
Administration especially in the first term (2000-2004). The unreciprocated European 
response to the US after September 11 and the subsequent fallout over Iraq are well 
documented.  As Boyer (2004, 81) states “the problem is that these efforts at change 
and ‘Alliance transformation’ no longer coincide with an automatically agreed vision 
of the international scene between the US and many of its European allies.” He goes 
on to say ‘[NATO’s] eminent task is so vague that indeed it authorises every type of 
action and opens the possibility that the Alliance address every type of problem that 
could be seen as threatening [its] values’ (2004, 82). 
NATO’s ability to be a transformer of sorts was curtailed in the first instance 
by changes in the alliance, changes in ESDP and changes in the transatlantic 
relationship. Yet, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a much larger impact on 
the way that militaries think about transformation as modernisation. In the next 
section, we look at the impact of the US transformation agenda on Europe within new 
martial, technological and environmental environments. 
 
Transformation agenda in Western Europe 
What exactly are we asking our militaries to do? Transformation can be 
defined as ‘a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined 
organisational structures, innovative processes, and adapted personnel developments 
that exploit national advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities’ 
(Jasper 2009, 2–3). For Scott Jasper, this transformation meant a move from a ‘threat-
based model’ of defence planning to that of the ‘capabilities-based’ model.5 On this 
scale, we should be able to see transformation along the lines of operational, 
                                                 
5 The ‘capabilities-based’ approach encapsulated what has been referred to as Effects-Based 
Approaches to Operations (EBAO). This label is used by Theo Farrell (2008) to discuss transformation 
in Europe and the UK specifically. 
organisational, and personnel changes that exploit technological innovation (2009, 4). 
Further to what I have stated previously, Jasper argues that transformation is 
fundamental given the rise in diversity in the sorts of insecurities that face states today, 
along the lines of non-state actors, rogue states, piracy, collapsed states, etc. This need 
for transformation follows in line with what Christopher Dandecker (1994) outlined in 
the early 1990s which is that we are facing an increased amount of constant shift in 
the international system. These are shifts in power, threat, decision-making, 
sovereignty and public opinion. All of these shifts impact on the way that militaries 
respond to events in some way. The diversity of challenges brings us back to a 
‘capabilities-based model’. With this, we should be able to see the impact of the 
transformation agenda through operational, organisational, and personnel changes. 
In addition to this framework, we need a matching framework that allows us to 
know transformation when we see it in West European militaries. A good place, 
though not the only, to start is the 2001 US Military Quadrennial Defence Review 
(QDR), which laid out transformation in the following way: 
 
1) Strengthening joint operations: Transformation prioritises speed and 
flexibility in operations. Speed refers to the start-up resources to respond to an 
immediate deployment. Flexibility on the other hand refers to the ‘scalable’ 
and ‘modular’ nature of forces ‘to allow combatant commanders to draw on 
the appropriate forces to deter or defeat an adversary’ (2001, 32). Further on, 
the QDR refers to the practical applications of this: ‘US forces require the 
ability to communicate not only with one another, but also with other 
government agencies and allies and friends’ (2001, 33). 
2) Experimentation on the ways of war: The QDR set out ways in which 
transformation could be tested in the battlespace. The document has a heavy 
focus on the role of exercises, war-games and simulations in addition to 
experiments. Important for us here is the extent to which Iraq and Afghanistan 
acted as live experimentation spaces. For US military, of particular interest 
was experimentation with ways to control space, which means both C4STAR 
and engagement (2001, 37). 
3) Exploiting intelligence advantages: Transformation included rethinking the 
way data would be used in intelligence and engagement. Of particular interest 
here is the US military Tasking, Processing, Exploiting and Dissemination 
(TPED) system (2001, 40). The system is a combination of intelligence forms 
(HUMINT, SIGINT, etc) used to inform and enhance integrated command 
infrastructures (themselves part of the transformation agenda). The effects of 
maximising intelligence advantages can be seen also on the ground in the 
battle space with the increased use of situational awareness displays. 
4) Developing transformational capabilities (p.40): Herein lies the clearest sense 
of a military in transformation. These new transformational capabilities are a 
list of thinking about how to collect and process data faster, cover space faster, 
and be flexible and respond faster. These transformational capabilities are 
directed towards defending bases as well as maintaining a presence in anti-
access and area-denial environments.  
 
For our purposes, we will look at the following as indications of this 
transformation, as laid out above: 1) network centricity, 2) expeditionary forces, and, 
3) effects-based operations. These transformative capabilities have had considerable 
impact on the US military as dictated by the literature and tactical operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. An important part of this revolution, as indicated, is the 
technological advances and edge that the US has had over potential enemies. The 
major problem that cannot be resolved here is whether this technological 
transformation is changing the nature and character of the battle space itself. 
Nevertheless, we can get an idea form this list of how transformation might look if 
adopted by European militaries. Naturally, we do not expect that an American version 
of transformation will transfer directly to European forces. However, privy to much of 
the same doctrine and technology not to mention having fought one, and in some 
cases, two wars with their American ally, we should expect some degree of 
transformation in West European militaries.  
The American approach to RMA or what we know today as transformation 
and even in some cases as modernisation has been discussed often in the literature 
(for instance Morgan 2000; Cohen 2004; Hamilton 2004; Hoffman 2006; Farrell and 
Rynning 2010). In fact, the discussion about changes in the US military go even 
further back, yet they do not need a review here. The key is that the changes in the US 
military around operations, organisations and personnel and how these have been 
affected by changes in strategic doctrine generally and advances in science and 
technology more specifically are a point of interest and concern for European forces, 
particularly because of the disparity in resources and posturing between the US and its 
transatlantic partners in and out of NATO. Our goal is to see how the US has shaped 
Western European forces. Our analytical framework looks at the UK, France and 
Germany across how operations, organisation and personnel have changed as a result 
of (changes in) network centricity, expeditionary forces and effects-based operations. 
The result of this study can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Snapshot analysis of force transformation in Europe 
 Network 
Centricity 
Expedition Forces Effects-Based 
Approach 
Operations UK: Iraq, 
Afghanistan, 
NATO Joint 
exercises, close US 
support 
 
 
France: 
Afghanistan, 
Operation 
Nemausus, NATO 
exercises  
 
Germany: AMN, 
Thales system 
UK: Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Army 
2020 programme, 
FRES (delayed), 
resource poor 
 
 
France: 
Afghanistan, 
Francaphone Africa 
 
 
 
Germany: Limited 
application in 
Afghanistan  
UK: Iraq, 
Afghanistan, 
NATO Joint 
exercises, 
diverging from US 
approach 
 
France: 
Afghanistan, 
Stabilisation 
operations, Kapisa 
mission 
 
Germany: ‘Three 
block warfare’ 
focus 
Organisations UK: NEC, Joint 
Doctrine and 
Concepts Centre, 
Bowman CIP, 
Skynet 5 
 
UK: TRACER and 
MREV 
programmes ended, 
MRAP replacement 
 
 
UK: JDCC/DCDC, 
Permanent Joint 
Head Quarters, 
Comprehensive 
Approach, Tactical 
Conflict 
  
 
France: NEB 
(digitisation), 
SICAT, SIC21, 
‘C4ISR On-the-
Move’ 
 
 
Germany: 
NetOpF, NEC, 
Transformation 
Coordination 
Group, 
SATCOMBw2, 
MobKommSysBw 
 
 
 
France: Model 
2014, consistent 
Army budget (joint 
services) 
Scorpion, SCF, 
BOA 
 
Germany: 
Konzeption der 
Bundeswehr 
(2004), 
Eingreifskraefte, 
modularisation, 
Assessment 
Framework  
 
France: EFR, 
DGA/Army split, 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany: 
Bundeswehr 
Transformation 
Centre 
Personnel UK: DII training 
and refit, 12 
Mechanised 
Brigade (Iraq) 
 
 
 
France: Limited 
 
 
 
 
Germany: Limited 
UK: Strategic 
doctrine 
development via 
Lessons 
Exploitation Centre 
(LXC), filtered into 
COIN 
France: ground 
manoeuvre 
brigades, Félin, 
HOBOT 
 
Germany: ISAF 
high/low intensity 
mix, skill set 
change 
UK: refitted for a 
commander –led 
culture, 52 
Brigade-Musa Qala 
 
 
 
France: PP30, 
CD&E 
 
 
 
Germany: Limited 
 
 While taking part in numerous military operations since the end of the Cold 
War, European militaries have been overwhelmingly fit for fighting Cold War 
operations. Whether from large-scale mechanised infantry or submarine hunters, 
European militaries were overwhelmingly fit for engaging the Soviet Union and its 
allies in a regional if not global war. The ability for European militaries to evolve 
away from this has been discussed in the literature in detail. If we look for example at 
the level of military spending by the UK, France and Germany, not in comparison, but 
over time, we can see that Germany dramatically reduced its overall defence budget 
and number of personnel.6 The UK and France did see some reduction in defence 
budgets though these were temporary until around 2010 when they began to decline 
again. The ability for European militaries to make a discernable shift in how they 
engage asymmetric warfare, that which has become most common in the post-Cold 
war period, however has been slow. 
                                                 
6 See the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute military expenditure index 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex (Last accessed 20 Jan 2014). 
 Network Centricity 
 The transformation agenda in the US started, as Colin Grey (1981) would have 
guessed, with a focus on technological advances.7 The nature of how technology 
could make militaries more flexible and responsive was especially appealing to early 
strategic thinkers such as Admiral William Owens, Vice Admiral Arthur K. 
Cebrowski and others. Network centricity became an important part of the US 
transformation agenda and subsequently a corner-stone to NATO transformation 
efforts. The notion of Network Centric Warfare is one of networks over platforms. 
Where platforms are preformed WYSIWYG (What You See Is What You Get) units 
that serve specific operational functions, networks are intended to inform operations 
in real time to allow for greater responsiveness and aptitude. Network centric theory, 
as it is, goes beyond that which we talk about here today (see In Athena’s Camp – 
Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age 1997; Barnett 1997; Alberts, Gartska, 
and Stein 1999; Dahl 2002). More importantly, we seek to see how networks have 
become a part of transformation of European militaries in strategic and operational 
terms. 
 The three militaries under observation came to network centricity at different 
times though all taking the concept from the US. As we shall see, network centricity 
was product of the US transformation agenda in and around NATO. The UK, France 
and Germany were affected by the US concept of NCW through bilateral coordination, 
institutionally in NATO and also by socialisation. Later, combat experience would 
play a major role in bringing networks to the fore for those operating in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Being the most closely aligned with the US, there was considerable 
openness to military ideas from across the Atlantic (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 
2013, 184–5). As the US and UK were headed into war together in Iraq in 2003, the 
UK defence establishment was consolidating its approach to NCW. Where NCW 
amounted to thinking of war and operations differently, the UK was more constrained 
in its approach. The concept of Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) was the British 
approach to network centricity. That change from NCW to NEC can be seen as the 
result of brakes being put on transformation, particularly in the British Army. ‘Two 
core British Army interests-organisational autonomy and size-were under assault 
during this period’ (2013, 184). At the same time, concerned with their relationship 
with the US military, the UK military maintained an emphasis on network centricity 
even as the Army was being scales back. ‘…it is to their tempo of deployment that the 
UK must aspire’8 As we shall see, the status of the Army in Europe, as it was in the 
US, would be a major factor in the take up of transformation concepts. 
 The UK MoD took NEC as important feature that characterised the 
development of the military (and in particular the British Army). The creation of the 
Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC, later the Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre DCDC) following the 1998 SDR is an illustration of how a shared 
programme of NEC would influence the implementation of network centricity in 
operations. The JDCC was an important organisational shift for the progress of NEC 
to take hold. The centre also reflects its US equivalent. The application of NEC in the 
field is inherently related to our next sections, especially effects-based approaches to 
operations. However, we can see how NEC shaped personnel through Defence 
                                                 
7 In this article, Colin Grey points to the important cultural attention to technological progress in 
American strategic culure. 
8 See the UK Joint High Level Operational Concept, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2003, para. 
704 http://ids.nic.in/UK%20Doctrine/UK.pdf (Last accessed 24 January 2014). 
Information Infrastructure (DII) training and the related equipment refit. This change 
in operations can be seen in the deployment of the 12 Mechanised Brigade in 2005 as 
the first brigade in HM Forces to bring the Bowman CIP system into service.9 British 
forces have been at the forefront in Europe of introducing network centricity, though 
as we shall see France has not been far behind and in many ways is moving ahead. 
 France came to the concept of network centricity more slowly, though they 
diverge on what has been accomplished. The French approach to transformation came 
about in the mid-1990s with a change in government and the introduction of the 
‘Model 2015’ military. With a model in hand, there were still considerable problems 
of professionalization and strategic thinking that needed to be done before 
transformation could take hold.  In the late 1990s though, NATO began running 
Multinational Digitized Interoperability Exercises (MDIEs) aimed at testing networks 
in combined and joint environments.10 According to Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, 
‘these exercises…sparked new thinking in France’ (2013, 220). The result was the 
French Army’s numerisation de l’espace’ de bataille (NEB). ‘NEB was new because 
it went beyond – below – the level of strategy and envisaged the operational and 
tactical integration of forces in one overarching information system’ (2013, 220). The 
French defence armaments procurement agency (DGA) established the PP30 
programme for modernising the military. The French Army came away from the 
modernisation experience with a need to create NCW within and developed SICAT 
(Systéme informatique de communication de l’armée de terre). SICAT was ‘…quite 
reasonably […] suited to the Army’s operation needs as opposed to technological or 
industrial imperatives…the problem was that SICAT did not communicate outside the 
Army’ (2013, 222) In other words, the French Army network was smaller than 
operationally necessary. For France, a major brake was the tension that existed 
between the DGA and the Army, where the former wanted to design and build out of 
what the latter thought best to fight. As we shall see further in the effects-based 
operations section, the story (and progress) does not stop here. 
 Unlike the UK, there was no direct pressure from either side for Germany to 
follow the US lead in NCW.  The German Bundeswehr was aware of the introduction 
and use of information technologies in the US, for the same reason as the French, 
through NATO programmes and exercises. However, the German response was quite 
different. The first major mention of network centricity was in the 2006 Defence 
White Paper.11 From this introduction, we get the establishment of the NetOpF 
protocol that, relying on the US characterisation of network centricity, lays out a 
future unveiling of Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) throughout the Bundeswehr. 
Ina Wiesner highlights how network centrality was introduced in Germany as based 
on the US notion of NCW but was ‘holistic and intellectual in nature’ (2013, 114). 
The German approach to network centricity is Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC). 
Where in the UK and French, as especially the US cases, the German military linked 
NEC specifically to effects. In other words, where the US sought to change the way 
specific functional operations looked and were used in the battle space, NEC was a 
way to enable ‘jointness and combinedness’ (2013, 116). The lofty role of NEC itself 
says something about the lack of implementation of network centricity in the 
                                                 
9 The 12 Mechanised Brigade began training with the Bowman system in 2003. See 
http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/29026.aspx (Last accessed: 27 January 2014) 
10 See http://www.eur.army.mil/exercises/ (Last accessed: 24 January 2014) 
11 See the Defence White Paper at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=156941 
(Last accessed 24 Jan 2014). 
Bundeswehr. Integration in the Bundeswehr is relatively poor in comparison to our 
other countries studies. Where the US, UK and France have all established joint 
command structures, the German MoD has had a long history without core 
competencies in this area (see Young 1996). As a result, coordination and even vital 
delegation of the NEC programme was lacking, though the Bundeswehr 
Transformation Coordination Group would wish it otherwise. Wiesner states 
‘between 2000 and 2005 the Bundeswehr Chief of the Armed Forces Staff and the 
Armed Forces Staff did not have the necessary authority over the other services, let 
alone the civilian directorates in the Ministry to direct NEC conceptualisation’ (2013, 
117). Most importantly, many of the drivers that we see in the UK and French cases, 
such as a ‘special’ relationship with the US, global position, or vested interests in 
defence industries, are not present in the German case. 
 While the US concept of network centricity had taken its different tones in the 
UK, France and Germany, combat operations would have a crystallising effect on the 
implementation of network centricity in the battlefield. The UK worked with and next 
to American soldiers both as special and conventional forces in Helmand province. 
Interoperability with the US was a vital function of that combat relationship. The UK 
has been able to use its NEC systems, such as Bowman CIP and Skynet 5 in 
operations. The French have also used Afghanistan as a way to deliver NEB through 
the use of SICAT and ‘C4ISR-on-the-move’. The French military were already 
showing their use of network centricity in 2004 in Operation Nemausus as part of a 
peace enforcement exercise (Rynning 2010, 66). In Ivory Coast and latter in 
Afghanistan, the French military used fully networked deployments to their advantage 
in the battle space. Though a slower start, Germany too has implemented some degree 
of network centricity in combat operations. Two programmes that have made this 
easier are worth mentioning (Wiesner 2013, 121). The first is SATCOMBw2 which 
saw the launch of two military community satellites in 2009 and 2010. This 
programme meant that the German military was less reliant on commercial satellites 
for broadband. MobKommSysBw initiated around the same time offers tactical data 
transfer across the network. All three of the cases studies were impacted by the launch 
of the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) established by the US to improve 
communications within ISAF. In 2010 when the German MoD could not provide a 
ready interoperable communications and information systems (CIS) solution, they 
responded by leasing the ‘off-the-shelf’ FOC+ system developed by the Thales Group. 
Wiesner explains: ‘This decision was spurred by the announcement of NATO HQ to 
deploy two US brigades to the Regional Command North, which was under German 
command.’ The lesson is that when the Americans come to join you, interoperability 
is a must. 
 Network centricity has been an important development for nearly every major 
military in the world. The Western European militaries discussed here have used it as 
a way to augment the way they collect and share information in the battle space as 
well as how they cooperate and coordinate with others. One of the major features of 
this development is the impact that it has had on equipment. In many ways, 
equipment links us to the next session. At the same time, we should avoid spending 
too much time on it here as it sits outside the scope of this essay. More importantly, 
the US impact on transformation through their own concept of NCW has been 
important and is inherently linked to the way we think about expeditionary forces and 
effects-based operations. 
 
Expeditionary forces 
As Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld had said that he wanted a ‘leaner, faster, 
meaner’ military. Yet, the move to make the US military ‘meaner’ and ‘faster’ (at 
least) started much before Rumsfeld took office, as we have seen already. The move 
to be faster and more responsive was an important element to the US transformation 
agenda. As US forces began to question how to master time and space in warfare, the 
role of expeditionary forces as rapid reaction, full spectrum forces rose again in 
interest that it had not seen since before the Second World War. The US focus on 
expeditionary forces built on a common martial heritage with European militaries. 
This shared history as well as a similar realisation of the changing character of the 
operations European states would take part in gives us reason to look at how the US 
transformation agenda influenced the UK, French and German forces. The key 
features of expeditionary forces in our cases are weight, resources and modularity as 
we look across operational, organisational and personnel effects. 
 The 1998 SDR in the UK set in motion a rethinking of how UK forces could 
respond to national and global security crises. 12 Coming out of the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, the focus was how to get forces in and out quickly. The focus in the US 
would be rethinking firepower: ‘meaner’. In the UK, the focus was less on lethality 
and more on deployability on a faster time-scale.13 The MoD continued a programme 
of establishing joint c Following the SDR, the MoD began on a medium-weight force 
that could be quickly deployed in a Yugoslav-type conflict on a quick basis. The 
programme was the FRES UV/SV. The US military had kitted their forces out with 
Stryker vehicles that could be quickly deployed and could withstand the risks in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. While the British Army was primarily fighting a budgetary battle 
while undergoing the greatest downsizing that it had ever seen, the conundrum 
became finding a vehicle that could suit forces while at the same time being generic 
enough to be used in a greater range of operations. The FRES programme was 
designed to do just that. Furthermore, the selected vehicle would need to be 
‘bowmanised’ (equipped with CIT systems) to support NEC in the field. The move to 
properly equip expeditionary forces has continually been thwarted, with the end of the 
TRACER and MREV programmes, hunt for MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected) replacements and further delay of the FRES programme. The hunt for a 
medium-weight, quick response force still is in need, though counter-insurgency 
(COIN) operations have dampened the demand for one. Even strategic doctrine 
development from the Lessons Exploitation Centre formerly aimed at expeditionary 
forces has become much more engaged with COIN. More recently, the Army 2020 
initiative sets out a new, smaller, more responsive (it is hoped) British Army that 
would be able to provide the type of forces required for expeditionary missions. The 
key question is whether budgets will trump strategic necessity in the future. We will 
return to this further in the conclusion. 
 The French Army has a long history of expeditionary forces, owing to their 
colonial and post-colonial military operations in Africa. As the Cold War needs of 
heavy artillery and mechanised infantry decreased, the French Army saw a new lease 
in expeditionary forces. The US transformation agenda and its focus on rapid-reaction, 
responsive forces was an important driver in this thinking. At the same time, France 
did not take part in NATO military committee but nonetheless followed the Strategy 
Review Group. Ministers even joined NATO ministerial meetings from 1995. A year 
prior, the 1994 Defence White Paper  ‘Model 2015’ called for a greater utility of 
                                                 
12 See www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP98-91.pdf (Last accessed 20 Jan 2014). 
13 Incidentally, the value of expeditionary forces comes to the fore if one reads on the conditions of the 
British response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. 
expeditionary forces, responding to the French participation in the crisis management 
operations in the former Yugoslavia (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 209). Rather 
than ‘leaner and meaner’, the French military saw expeditionary forces as being a 
broader platform of engagement that could deal with anything from kinetic operations 
to ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW). 
 The development of expeditionary forces, as elsewhere, was partly determined 
by strategic objectives and military political economics. Unlike its British counter-
part, the French Army was doing well in terms of budgets in relation to the other 
services. If transformation were to happen in the Army, it would have to pay for it. 
The result was the iteration of the NEB as discussed earlier as well as new 
programmes. Concentrating on the need to be fast and flexible, the French Army 
established new ground manoeuvre brigades capitalise on medium to light weight 
equipment and modularity where by specific functions ‘plug’ and ‘unplug’ depending 
on the nature of operation. Furthermore, the Félin combat system sets to remake the 
French Army soldier through the kit that he/she carries. Félin is a set of networked 
equipment ‘enhancing his information level, vision, protection and ability to shoot 
without exposing his body’ (2013, 260). In this sense, the system represents an 
exoskeleton which can be cumbersome for conventional combat infantry to withstand 
on a prolonged basis. The Félin system is also being used in other militaries (e.g. 
Australia). The science and technological advances of materials may make the unit 
less cumbersome over time. Nevertheless, the important point is that this system 
along with the HOBOT (homme robot) programme tells us about the converging 
nature of transformation in the French and US cases where fire power, flexibility and 
intelligence are being maximised at the cost of more traditional tactics. 
 Unlike the UK and France, Germany has taken much less away from the US 
transformation agenda around the case of expedition warfare. Beyond German special 
forces, expeditionary concepts and approaches have been lacking on the ground. 
Where Iraq and Afghanistan have been important for experimentation of 
transformative concepts and technologies, Germany has restrained for a series of 
reasons to do with domestic politics, military culture and the perspective on future 
conflicts (see Dyson 2005; 2011). Some degree of expeditionary thinking has 
occurred at least in the conceptual phase. For instance, the Konzeption der 
Bunderwehr in 2004 set out the need for the Bundeswehr to be responsive to a ‘third 
block strategy’, building on the US military notion of multiple operational needs in 
theatre. Furthermore, through the Eingriefskraefte units have been established to act 
as fast response intervening troops that could be defined as proto-expeditionary units. 
Beyond this, modularisation remains a priority for the Bundeswehr as it perceives 
being responsive for various forms of operations, not all being kinetic. Like our other 
case studies, the framework for expeditionary forces is coming into place for 
Germany. The key difference, as Tom Dyson illustrates in his work, is the lack of will 
and structure for making such strategic decisions. 
 While the nature and implementation of expeditionary forces varies across 
case studies, we can see an impact from the US transformation agenda. Many of the 
US conceptual programmes of the 1990s have been made their way through to the UK, 
France and Germany especially as part of modernisation as well as combat experience 
particularly in Afghanistan. ‘If Europe emerges with smaller border-defence forces 
but far better expeditionary strike forces, it will have gained hugely in the bargain’ 
(Binnendijk and Kugler 2007, 129). Importantly, discussing network centricity and 
expeditionary forces requires us to engage with how these militaries have attempted 
to internalise effects-based approaches to operations. To this we turn our attention. 
 Effects-based approach 
The notion of effects-based operations (EBO) was a way to ask the question of what 
do you want out of a military operation? From this broad perspective, EBO in the 
American sense came to be used for a variety of approaches in our three case studies. 
In the US, EBO challenged the US Army to think and deliver differently. Originally a 
US Air Force concept, EBO was applied in the military as away to transition away 
from large regimental platforms fit for defending Western Europe against a Soviet 
invasion towards a ‘leaner’, ‘meaner’ and more flexible response to full spectrum 
operations (in other words, how to make the army still relevant in modern warfare). 
With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, EBO became more than simply remaking the 
soldier into a all-around soldier but encapsulated the wide spectrum of duties that 
came with military intervention in these states. For the US, this meant tailoring 
ground operations to match the ends, which meant ranging from state building to 
COIN to open kinetic warfare. The crux of the US approach to EBO has been the joint 
and combined nature of operations. European militaries also used in especially in the 
armies and applied it to their own combat experiences.  
 The UK sought to use EBO as a way of revising a holistic approach to military 
operations. While beginning with the US approach to EBO, the UK JDCC/DCDC led 
the way in fashioning a British approach to EBO (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013, 
145). When it came time to test the concept in a joint exercise in 2005 (Joint Venture 
5), the coming together of services resulted in an overly complex command structure. 
In a ‘British culture of mission command’, the JDCC quickly replaced EBO with a 
more British ‘effects-based approach to operations’ (EBAO). ‘The EBAO was recast 
as a ‘way of thinking’ about planning and operations, rather than a hard and fast 
science as suggested in US doctrine on EBO’ (2013, 145). Furthermore, EBAO was 
recast as a way to improve the relationship between the military and other government 
agencies (i.e. ‘joined-up government’). The now DCDC put EBAO in place as a 
philosophy of operations rather than a rule book. From this point, we get the 
‘comprehensive approach’ which we will see in France and Germany as well. The 
comprehensive approach set out to encompass the multitude of political, economic, 
social and military objectives in the battle space. For the UK military, network 
centricity and expeditionary forces were key to EBAO in as much as they were the 
tools by which the military would use in the field to engage with this more complex, 
comprehensive approach. The tensions within the way the UK approached EBAO in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are many and are work investigating, but set outside of our 
study. The key issue to take forward is that the US concept of EBO was worth 
adopting in the first instance, but quickly needed to be nationalised in the face of 
politics and resources in the military and government. 
 The French relationship with the US, poor as it was, impacted on the nature of 
transformation in that socialisation and coercion did not influence France in the same 
way it might had done other full NATO countries. The French Army saw in the US 
transformation agenda an opportunity to remake themselves following the end of the 
Cold War, much in the same entrepreneurial spirit as the British and German armies. 
The key different however is that the French Air Force and Navy had less 
communication with the US and less reason to seek joint operations with one another 
or with the Army. As a result, French EBO thinking began with a lack of the 
‘jointness’ that our other case studies experienced. While France continued to reach 
out to NATO, and eventually re-join, French transformation was about rethinking the 
use of force but not necessarily simply importing US ideas about modern warfare. 
Where the US had EBO and the UK EBAO, France has a ‘synergy of effects’ which 
can be found rooted in the French martial thought from Antoine-Henri Jomini 
onwards. With the connection between NEB and expeditionary forces with EBAO 
confirmed in the UK case, it is little surprise perhaps that the ‘…synergy of effects is 
an outgrowth of the information technology inherent in NCW and the mobility 
inherent in expeditionary warfare…’ (2013, 240). Needless to say, when we return to 
the divisive relationship illustrated around NEB of the tension between the DGA and 
the Army as well as the Army and the other services just mentioned, we can see a 
challenge to the implementation of EBO in France. More recently, the needs for joint 
command operations (or coherence) have been more full recognised, such as in the 
PP30 transformation process, perhaps under the return to NATO and experience in 
Afghanistan and in CSDP missions in Africa. 
Finally, Germany’s relationship with EBO was perhaps the most limited. Tom 
Dyson (2011) illustrates the internal, structural reasons why the US concept of EBO 
had less traction in Germany. The key reason for its articulation in the military is the 
lack of a joint command responsibility within the Bundeswehr that could have made 
the process. Referring to what they label ‘effects-based thinking’, the previously 
introduced concept of ‘three block warfare’ represents the limitations of EBO in the 
Bundeswehr. German doctrine, such as that coming out of the Bundeswehr 
Transformation Centre, has not taken EBO further despite NATO influence and 
Afghanistan experience. In as much as EBO has influenced German military doctrine, 
we can see a casual assumption that the Bundeswehr has been doing effects-based 
thinking all along. The result is a limited impact on operations, organisations and 
personnel. 
 
Conclusion: transformation or adaptation? 
We began with a question of whether West European forces were following or falling 
behind. The previous analysis suggests that in as much as the US transformation 
agenda is an important driver of force transformation in Europe, there are many 
impediments to internalising American military concepts into domestic military 
contexts. Taken together, network centricity, expeditionary warfare and effects-based 
approaches make for a tidy understanding of transformation as befitting the US 
agenda. While we have talked about them separately here, and they have different 
champions and constraints in reality, they are in fact very closely connected as 
illustrated in the US QDR that started us off. American influence has been active 
through NATO as well as through combat experience in Afghanistan and (for the UK) 
Iraq. Currently, the role of transformation in Europe is as much hemmed in by 
budgets and political willingness as it is about strategic narratives of transformation 
coming from the US (see Strachan 2013). Based on this and the study here, the 
conclusion is one of following rather than following behind. 
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